First Dying Declaration Enough To Convict Despite Minor Variations In Later Statements: SC

Last Updated:November 03, 2025, 16:42 IST

The trial court had acquitted both the accused persons, mainly on the ground that there are discrepancies in three dying declarations of the deceased.

The Supreme Court of India. (File)

The Supreme Court has on October 29, 2025 said merely because there are minor discrepancies in the version given by the prosecution witness with regard to the dying declaration and to the manner of occurrence of the incident, the first dying declaration given by the deceased before the independent witness, the doctor, cannot be ignored.

A bench of Justices Rajesh Bindal and Vipul M Pancholi dismissed an appeal filed by Jemaben against the Gujarat High Court’s judgment of July 21, 2016, which reversed her acquittal and held her guilty of killing Leelaben by setting her ablaze on the intervening night of November 29, and November 30, 2004. The appellant was the aunt-in-law of the deceased and forced the victim to go with another man.

It was alleged that the appellant and the co-accused, Bherabhai Revaji Majirana, entered into criminal conspiracy in order to kill Leelaben and Ganesh, her son. On the date of the incident, when Leelaben and her son were sleeping in their hut, the appellant/accused poured kerosene upon Leelaben and set her ablaze. On December 04, 2004, Leelaben succumbed to the injuries.

The trial court acquitted both the accused persons, mainly on the ground that there are discrepancies in three dying declarations given by Leelaben, the deceased.

On an appeal filed by the State, the High Court set aside the order of acquittal passed by the concerned trial court.

The appellant’s counsel contended that there are major discrepancies in the three dying declarations given by the deceased, the trial court has acquitted the appellant/accused by giving benefit of doubt to the appellant/accused.

Therefore, even if there are two views possible on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution before the trial court, when the trial court has taken the one possible view, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the said view taken by the trial court, the counsel said.

The State counsel mainly submitted that, in the case of multiple dying declarations, each dying declaration will have to be considered independently on its own merit as to its evidentiary value and one cannot be rejected because of the contents of the other.

The state counsel submitted that the statement of the deceased, recorded first in point of time, revealed that the deceased was burnt by the appellant, who was the aunt-in-law of the deceased, by pouring kerosene from the tin and setting the deceased on fire.

On the very same day, the deceased described the motive behind the incident that the appellant was compelling the deceased to go with one, Mania Dabhawala, with whom the appellant was acquainted and her refusal resulted into the incident in question, the counsel said.

Having perused the entire record and the evidence led by the prosecution, the bench said it emerged that when the deceased was brought to the hospital, she narrated the incident before the doctor wherein she specifically stated that “my aunt-in-law, Jemaben poured kerosene on me and set ablaze." Further, when she was asked again by the doctor, she disclosed that “my aunt-in-law asked me to go with Mania Dabhawala, I refused for the same and, therefore, she burnt me alive".

The court also held the theory of accidental fire at the place of incident put forward by the appellant cannot be believed, in view of evidence available on record.

The bench thus said, “We are of the view that merely because there are minor discrepancies in the version given by the prosecution witness with regard to the dying declaration and with regard to the manner of occurrence of the incident, the first dying declaration given by the deceased before the independent witness, i.e the doctor, cannot be ignored."

The court found that the first dying declaration was supported by an independent documentary evidence. Therefore, the High Court has rightly placed reliance upon the decision rendered by this court in the case of Nallam Veera Stayanandam & Ors Vs Public Prosecutor, High Court of AP, (2004) and thereby, rightly set aside the order of acquittal rendered by the trial court qua the appellant, the bench said.

The court opined on the basis of the evidence only one view was possible, despite which, the trial court had acquitted the appellant. Thus, the High Court has rightly set aside the order of the trial court, it said.

The court finally dismissed the appeal, holding that no interference was required in the impugned judgment passed by the High Court.

Sanya Talwar

Sanya Talwar, Editor at Lawbeat, has been heading the organisation since its inception. After practising in courts for over four years, she discovered her affinity for legal journalism. She has worked previousl...Read More

Sanya Talwar, Editor at Lawbeat, has been heading the organisation since its inception. After practising in courts for over four years, she discovered her affinity for legal journalism. She has worked previousl...

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