India’s Queasy Federalism

The Constitution (130th Amendment) Bill has brought a foundational question to the forefront. How federal is India, really? The amendment that seeks to automatically remove any minister – including a CM or the PM – from office if they are held in custody for 30 consecutive days for an offence punishable by five or more years, is, per govt, aimed at cleansing politics of criminal elements. Intent may be laudable, but the procedure to enact this change highlights a deep, structural imbalance in India’s constitutional framework, revealing a deep federal deficit.
Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution flows from

Article 368

that stipulates a special majority for most amendments. However, clause (2) identifies certain ‘entrenched’ provisions that are fundamental to the federal structure, such as the election of the President, the extent of executive power of the Union and the states, and the representation of states in Parliament.