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Court held that the power of suspension is inherent in the employer-employee relationship and is not derived from the POSH Act. (AI image)
In a significant ruling on the interplay between service law and workplace harassment jurisprudence, the Delhi High Court has held that while employers retain inherent power to suspend employees, complaints of sexual harassment must be dealt with strictly within the statutory framework of the POSH Act, and not through parallel fact-finding mechanisms.Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav set aside the suspension of a college principal, holding that the impugned order was “stigmatic” and that the constitution of an ad hoc committee to examine allegations of sexual harassment was contrary to law.Background of the CaseThe matter arose from multiple complaints made by three Assistant Professors against the petitioner, who was serving as Principal of Ramanujan College under the University of Delhi.
The complaints, submitted between March and April 2025, alleged misconduct including behaviour amounting to sexual harassment.Acting on these complaints, the Deputy Registrar (Colleges), University of Delhi, constituted an ad hoc fact-finding committee on 05.05.2025 to examine the allegations. The committee conducted preliminary interactions and submitted its report on 23.06.2025.The report noted that the allegations were serious, indicated a possible climate of fear, and could fall within the scope of sexual harassment under the POSH Act.
It recommended that the matter be placed before the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) for further action.The Collage, relying on this report, and with the approval of the Vice-Chancellor, issued a suspension order on 18.09.2025 placing the petitioner under suspension pending inquiry.The petitioner challenged both the constitution of the fact-finding committee and the suspension order before the High Court.Procedural DevelopmentsAt the initial stage, the High Court stayed the suspension order and directed that the ICC independently consider whether any interim measures were required.The matter also came before a Division Bench in appeal, which clarified that the controversy raised important legal questions, including whether institutions could suspend employees in POSH matters and whether parallel inquiry mechanisms were permissible.The case was thereafter heard in detail by the Single Judge.Against this backdrop, the Court was called upon to decide whether the employer’s power of suspension operates independently of the POSH Act, whether the constitution of a fact-finding committee was legally sustainable, and whether the impugned suspension order suffered from illegality on account of being stigmatic.Petitioner’s ArgumentsThe Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner argued that the entire process adopted by the respondents was legally flawed and violative of the statutory scheme.
It was submitted that the POSH Act provides a complete and self-contained mechanism for dealing with complaints of sexual harassment, and any determination on whether conduct amounts to sexual harassment must be made exclusively by the ICC.The petitioner argued that the creation of an ad hoc fact-finding committee amounted to setting up a parallel adjudicatory mechanism unknown to law. It was further argued that the findings of such a committee formed the basis of adverse action without adherence to principles of natural justice.It was argued that:“If the statute prescribes a manner, it must be followed in that manner alone.”On the suspension order, the petitioner argued that the language used in the suspension order, cast a stigma by referring to “serious misconduct and harassment,” thereby prejudicing his reputation even before any lawful inquiry was conducted.Respondents’ StandThe respondents, defending the impugned action, argued that the employer possesses inherent authority to suspend an employee pending inquiry.
It was argued that the constitution of a fact-finding committee was merely a preliminary administrative exercise intended to assist decision-making and did not substitute the statutory process.The respondents further argued that suspension is not a punishment but an interim measure, and therefore cannot be termed stigmatic. It was further argued that the employer is entitled to take preventive steps to ensure a fair inquiry and maintain institutional discipline.Court on Power to Suspend in POSH CasesThe Court first examined whether the employer could suspend an employee in a case involving allegations under the POSH Act.Answering in the affirmative, the Court held that the power of suspension is inherent in the employer-employee relationship and is not derived from the POSH Act.The Court observed:“The power of suspension lies with the institution and is inherent to the office itself.”The Court further held:“The PoSH Act is in addition to, and not in derogation of, existing service rules.”The Court emphasized that the statutory framework does not curtail the employer’s power to suspend, but such power must still be exercised in accordance with law.It added that:“The employer’s authority to place an employee under suspension survives wholly intact alongside the PoSH Act.”On the question of the ad hoc committee, the Court delivered a clear ruling.It held that once the statute mandates that complaints of sexual harassment must be inquired into by the Internal Complaints Committee, any parallel mechanism would be outside the framework of law.The Court observed:“Once the statute mandates that the ICC shall inquire into complaints, any parallel mechanism would be de hors the Act.”Rejecting the respondents’ justification, the Court noted:“Such a committee is unknown to the statutory scheme and cannot be permitted to supplant or supplement the ICC.”The Court further cautioned that permitting such parallel processes would defeat the purpose of the legislation:“The creation of such committees has the potential of rendering the PoSH Act nugatory.”It held that sexual harassment complaints require a specialized, time-bound, and legally structured inquiry, which cannot be substituted by informal or ad hoc exercises. The Court also found that the fact-finding committee lacked procedural safeguards and operated without any statutory backing.The Court observed:“No person shall be a judge in his own cause, and every affected person must be afforded a fair opportunity of hearing.”It held that the process adopted failed to meet the standards of fairness and impartiality required in law, rendering the exercise legally unsustainable.Suspension Order Held StigmaticTurning to the suspension order, the Court acknowledged that suspension per se is not punitive. However, it held that the manner in which the order was worded crossed permissible limits.
The Court noted that the order referred to allegations of “serious misconduct and harassment,” which would inevitably create a negative impression.In a crucial observation, the Court held:“The reproduction of the nature of allegations… is an editorial judgment which the employer is not entitled to make at the stage of suspension.”It further emphasized:“No opinion should be formed, and no stigma should be imposed at the stage of suspension.”The Court observed that such language effectively prejudges the issue and undermines the presumption of innocence.It added that:“A suspension order cannot be used as a vehicle to cast aspersions or record conclusions which are yet to be adjudicated.”The Court held that while the employer retains inherent power to suspend an employee even in matters arising under the POSH Act, the constitution of an ad hoc fact-finding committee to examine allegations of sexual harassment is impermissible and contrary to the statutory scheme of the Act, and further held that the suspension order dated 18.09.2025, by referring to allegations of “serious misconduct and harassment,” was stigmatic in nature and liable to be set aside.Accordingly quashing the suspension order, the Delhi High Court granted the liberty to the college to issue a fresh order in accordance with law, while observing that any action taken must strictly adhere to the statutory framework and cannot dilute the mandate of the POSH Act.W.P.(C) 14760/2025, CM APPL. 60742/2025, CM APPL. 6409/2026, CM APPL. 80060/2025Date of Decision: 24.04.2026PROF. RASAL SINGH vs University of Delhi and Ors.For Petitioner: Ms. Geeta Luthra, Senior Advocate with Ms Shalini Singh, Ms Prashansika Thakur, Mr Lakshay Saini, Advocates.)For Respondents: Mr. Mohinder JS Rupal, Mr. Hardik Rupal, Ms. Aishwarya Malhotra and Ms. Tripta Sharma Advocates for R-1. Mr. Jayant Mehta, Sr. Adv. with Ms. Jyoti Taneja, Mr. Shivam Malhotra and Mr. Pallav Arora, Advocates for R-2.(The author of this article, Vatsal Chandra is a Delhi-based Advocate practicing before the courts of Delhi NCR.)


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