Rape by in-laws can form part of matrimonial cruelty: Delhi High Court sets aside discharge on jurisdiction ground

The Delhi High Court in a major decision on territorial jurisdiction and matrimonial offences has held that charges of rape by in-laws, entrenched within an ongoing cycle of cruelty, cannot be segregated from offences under Section 498A IPC merely on territorial grounds.Justice Amit Mahajan set aside the discharge of the father-in-law and brother-in-law from rape charges, holding that such allegations formed part of the “same transaction” as matrimonial cruelty and could be tried together by a Delhi court where the complainant had taken shelter.Background of the caseThe case arose from a matrimonial dispute following the marriage of the petitioner with Respondent No.2 on 20.01.2020.

The petitioner claimed that she was subjected to dowry harassment, physical abuse, and to extreme forms of cruelty at her matrimonial home in Jhajjar, Haryana. The complaint was lodged after the petitioner took refuge at her parental home in Delhi upon being allegedly driven out of her matrimonial home. In her complaint, she levelled serious charges, including that she was deceived into marriage as her husband had prior subsisting marriages, and that she was repeatedly subjected to violence and coercion for dowry.

The FIR, registered in Delhi after she returned to her parental home, contained serious accusations of sexual assault. She alleged:“My husband forced me to eat cake and pastries… I used to become unconscious… thereafter, my father in-law… and brother in-law raped me.”She further stated that when she reported the incidents to other family members, she was threatened and assaulted:“they thrashed me and threatened me… that if I wish to remain in their house, I have to bear all that…”After investigation, the chargesheet was filed for offences under Sections 498A, 406, 376, 34 IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.However, the Additional Sessions Judge (ASJ) discharged the father-in-law and brother-in-law from the offence under Section 376 IPC, holding that the acts of rape occurred in Haryana and therefore fell outside the territorial jurisdiction of Delhi courts.The ASJ further held that the accusations of rape were not part of the same transaction as cruelty and dowry harassment, and thus could not be tried together.

Subsequently, the Magistrate framed charges only for cruelty and dowry-related offences, discharging one accused entirely.Challenges before the Court The petitioner challenged the discharge order, arguing that the acts of rape were not isolated incidents but formed part of a continuous chain of cruelty inflicted within the matrimonial home.It was argued that the acts of rape “are an extension of and in furtherance of the entire set of allegations… and form part of the same circumstances and chain of events.”The State and accused opposed the petition, relying on precedent to argue that lack of territorial jurisdiction justified discharge.At the outset, the High Court reiterated the limited scope of interference in revision proceedings:“The power ought to be exercised sparingly… It is not open to the Court to… reappreciate the evidence unless any glaring perversity is brought to its notice.”However, it clarified that jurisdictional errors affecting the administration of justice warranted correction.

The Court undertook an extensive analysis of Sections 177, 178, 179, 184, and 220 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.It reiterated the general rule:“Every offence shall ordinarily be… tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.”However, exceptions apply where offences are continuing, partially committed in multiple locations, or where consequences ensue elsewhere.The Court emphasized that:“if an offence is committed partly in one place and partly in another… the courts in the latter place would be competent to take cognizance.”Jurisdiction In Matrimonial Cruelty CasesRelying on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rupali Devi v. State of U.P., the Court affirmed that cruelty under Section 498A IPC can be tried at the place where the wife takes shelter after leaving the matrimonial home.Quoting the Supreme Court, the Court noted:“the mental trauma and the psychological distress… would continue to persist at the parental home.”Thus, even if acts occurred in Haryana, their continuing impact in Delhi conferred jurisdiction for cruelty-related offences.The Court also implicitly applied the principle under Section 179 CrPC, recognising that the consequences of cruelty, including psychological trauma, continued at the parental home, thereby conferring jurisdiction upon Delhi courts.Further, the central issue before the Court was whether the rape could be tried along with cruelty under the “same transaction” principle under Section 220 CrPC.The Court explained that the expression “same transaction” depends on:“proximity of time, unity or proximity of place, continuity of action and community of purpose or design.”Applying these principles, the Court made a crucial observation:“sexual assault is also a form of cruelty…”The Court thus elevated sexual assault within matrimonial settings as an aggravated manifestation of cruelty, bringing it within the continuum of offences under Section 498A IPC rather than treating it as an isolated offence.It further held:“if the rape is committed by in-laws as an aggravated form of physical cruelty, the same cannot be deemed to be disjunct from the offence of cruelty…”The Court emphasized the continuity of harm:“the victim wife… carries the mental trauma caused by such acts to the place she takes refuge.”Examining the complaint, the Court noted that the allegations of rape were not isolated but were intertwined with ongoing cruelty, coercion, and threats.The Court recorded:“the allegation of rape certainly forms part and parcel of the continued alleged cruelty…”It further held:“the allegations of rape are ingrained in those of cruelty and the same cannot be separated…”On this basis, the Court concluded:“the allegations… satisfy the threshold of being ‘a series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction’.”The Court found that the ASJ had erred in treating the rape allegations as independent and disconnected from cruelty. The Court not only set aside the order of the ASJ but also quashed the subsequent order of the Magistrate framing charges limited to lesser offences.It held:“the learned ASJ erred in discharging… on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.”The Court clarified that once offences form part of the same transaction, they can be tried together:“the alleged offences… may be inquired into or tried by any Court competent to try any of the offences.”The Court specifically relied on the combined reading of Sections 220 and 184 CrPC to hold that once offences form part of the same transaction, they may be tried together by any competent court, thereby curing territorial limitations. The High Court distinguished the reliance placed on Ms. Pxxx v. State of Uttarakhand, where separate incidents lacked continuity.It noted:“there was no continuity of actions and community of purpose… in the two different acts…”In contrast, the present case involved:“continuity of action and community of purpose… clearly established.”Final DirectionsSetting aside both the ASJ’s discharge order and the Magistrate’s subsequent order, the Court held:“the impugned order… are set aside.”The matter was remanded for fresh consideration on merits by the Sessions Court.The Court clarified:“this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the allegations…”On the issue of alleged non-investigation into prior marriages of the husband, the Court granted liberty:“the petitioner is at liberty to file an appropriate application… regarding… allegations of bigamy.”The parties were directed to appear before the Sessions Court for further proceedings.CRL.REV.P. 723/2024, CRL.M.A. 16673/2024, CRL.M.A. 6295/2025 & CRL.M.A. 28375/2025X vs YFor Petitioner: Mr. Amit Gupta, Mr. Prateek Mehta, Mr. Kshitij Vaibhav, Ms. Muskan Nagpal, Advocates. For Respondent: Ms. Shaini Bhardwaj, Ms. Rukhsar and Mr. Vedic Thukral, Advocates.(The author of this article, Vatsal Chandra is a Delhi-based Advocate practicing before the courts of Delhi NCR.)