Court backs Centre's Telegram ban: Where does digital freedom stand?

The Delhi High Court on Friday upheld the government's decision to temporarily block access to the messaging platform Telegram ahead of the June 21 NEET-UG re-examination, accepting the Centre's argument that the app poses a significant risk of facilitating the rapid dissemination of leaked examination material.

A bench led by Justice Tejas Karia delivered the verdict after hearing extensive arguments earlier this week. The ruling comes amid heightened scrutiny of examination security following a series of alleged paper leaks that have affected major competitive tests across the country.

The case touches upon a larger and unresolved question in Indian digital jurisprudence: under what circumstances can the government block access to an entire online platform for the actions of a subset of its users?

WHY HIGH COURT BACKED THE BAN

In its judgment, the High Court accepted the Centre's contention that Telegram's architecture enables the rapid amplification and mass distribution of information. The government argued that the platform's ability to accommodate large channels and groups makes it particularly susceptible to misuse in cases involving examination leaks.

The court observed that unlawful content shared on Telegram can reach a vast number of users within minutes, potentially creating public-order concerns. It further noted that even when authorities identify and disable a channel engaged in unlawful activity, administrators can quickly create mirror channels under different names and redirect subscribers, effectively circumventing enforcement measures.

The judgment also flagged concerns over Telegram's message-editing feature. According to the court, files and messages can be modified after being sent, creating the possibility of misinformation. For example, an attachment could allegedly be altered after an examination and then presented as evidence of a prior paper leak, potentially misleading authorities and the public.

A central aspect of the ruling concerns the government's powers under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The court held that the Act's definition of "information" expressly includes "codes," "computer programmes," and "software," bringing applications and digital platforms within its scope.

According to the judgment, applications and platforms perform logical, arithmetic, storage and communication functions through computer systems and networks. As a result, information generated, transmitted, stored or hosted through such software infrastructure falls within the ambit of Section 69A, empowering the government to block public access to platforms such as Telegram.

Sources familiar with the matter told India Today that Telegram is considering challenging the order. The restrictions are expected to remain in place until June 30, with the ban aimed primarily at preventing the circulation of leaked material during the conduct of the NEET-UG re-examination.

THE LARGER LEGAL QUESTION

While the government and the High Court have justified the move on grounds of public order and security, the ruling has sparked concern among digital-rights advocates and legal experts, who warn that it could set a far-reaching precedent for internet governance in India.

Apar Gupta, Director of the Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF), argues that Indian law generally shields intermediaries from liability for user-generated content. Under Section 79 of the IT Act, platforms enjoy "safe harbour" protection as long as they comply with due-diligence requirements and act on lawful takedown orders issued by courts or government authorities.

Gupta points to the Supreme Court's landmark ruling in Shreya Singhal v Union of India case, which clarified that platforms are not expected to independently determine the legality of content. Liability arises only when a platform ignores a valid legal order or fails to comply with statutory obligations.

According to Gupta, responsibility for a leaked examination paper lies with the individual who leaked it and may attract penalties under the Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024. For the platform, however, such content remains user-generated unless the intermediary knowingly facilitates the unlawful activity or refuses to comply with lawful directions.

His primary concern relates to the court's interpretation of Section 69A. Gupta argues that when the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 69A in the Shreya Singhal verdict, it did so on the understanding that the provision would be used narrowly to block specific pieces of content rather than entire communication platforms. Extending that power to platform-wide bans, he says, risks allowing authorities to effectively switch off communications used by millions of people.

He also questions whether the government's action meets the constitutional test of proportionality laid down in Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India case. That judgment requires authorities to demonstrate that no less restrictive alternative was available. Critics argue that if specific channels or content could have been targeted and removed, a blanket ban affecting millions of users may fail that test.

SAFE HARBOUR, SURVEILLANCE AND ENCRYPTION

The debate also touches on surveillance and access to private communications. Legal experts note that the extent to which a platform can access user communications depends largely on its technical architecture.

End-to-end encrypted services such as WhatsApp, Signal and Telegram's "Secret Chats" prevent service providers from reading message content. By contrast, cloud-based chats can generally be accessed by the platform itself.

Under Section 69 of the IT Act and related interception rules, authorised government agencies may intercept, monitor or decrypt information in specified circumstances involving national security, public order, or criminal investigations. Similar powers are now available under the Telecommunications Act, 2023, and the Telecommunications (Procedures and Safeguards for Lawful Interception of Messages) Rules, 2024.

Nikhil Narendran, Partner at Trilegal, argues that Telegram cannot automatically be held liable merely because some users misuse the platform. Liability, he says, arises only if the platform actively participates in unlawful conduct or knowingly fails to comply with lawful government directions.

Narendran also contends that platform-wide bans are often ineffective because they disproportionately impact ordinary users, while bad actors can migrate to alternative services or use virtual private networks (VPNs). "Telegram is only the messenger," he argues, adding that authorities should instead focus on strengthening examination security and prosecuting those responsible for leaks.

Namita Viswanath, Partner at CMS INDUSLAW, echoes similar concerns. She notes that intermediaries enjoy statutory protection from liability for third-party content unless they actively aid unlawful conduct or fail to remove illegal content after receiving lawful notice. Blanket restrictions, she warns, can significantly affect users who rely on such platforms for communication, education, business and access to information.

DEFINING TEST FOR INDIA'S DIGITAL FUTURE

The Delhi High Court's ruling raises questions that extend well beyond the NEET-UG re-examination.

At its heart lies a fundamental debate: how should India balance examination integrity, public order and national-security concerns against constitutional protections for free expression, access to information and an open internet?

Whether higher courts ultimately endorse this broader interpretation of the government's blocking powers could have lasting implications for digital rights, intermediary liability and the future of internet regulation in India.

- Ends