Rajya Sabha defections, constitutional questions

The recent developments within the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), appear to have dealt a decisive blow to its representation in the Rajya Sabha. On April 24, 2026, seven out of its 10 sitting Members of Parliament, publicly announced that over two-thirds of the party’s MPs had decided to merge with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), invoking the provisions of the 10th Schedule of the Constitution.

While the development has attracted widespread political attention, its implications extend beyond immediate partisan concerns. It raises significant constitutional questions regarding the interpretation of the anti-defection law, particularly the scope of the “merger” exception under the 10th Schedule. Nor is the episode entirely unprecedented. Similar assertions of legislative strength have been witnessed at the State level, most notably in the case of the Eknath Shinde-led faction in the Shiv Sena within the Maharashtra Assembly. However, the present instance assumes greater significance as it unfolds at the national level, involving MPs in the Rajya Sabha, thereby amplifying its constitutional and political consequences.

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Anti-defection framework, ‘split’ doctrine

The Constitution, as originally adopted in 1950, provided for disqualification of MPs on limited grounds under Article 103, to be decided by the President of India acting on the opinion of the Election Commission of India. The 10th Schedule, introduced by the 52nd Constitution Amendment Act, 1985, expanded this framework to address the persistent problem of political defections adding another ground for disqualification of members to be decided by the Speaker or Chairman. The objective was to curb the practice of elected representatives abandoning their parties for political gain, by attaching the consequence of disqualification.

At the same time, the Schedule originally carved out two exceptions, “split” under Paragraph 3 and “merger” under Paragraph 4. The first, which recognised a split in a legislature party where one-third of its members formed a separate faction, was subsequently deleted by the 91st Constitution Amendment Act, 2003, following recommendations of Electoral Reforms (Dinesh Goswami Committee) in May 1990 and the 170th Law Commission Report, 1999. This deletion marked a conscious shift away from recognising internal fractures within legislature parties as a legitimate defence to defection.

The omission of Paragraph 3 carries deeper implications. The concept of “split” had implicitly recognised a degree of autonomy in the legislature party vis-à-vis the political party. Its removal signals Parliament’s clear intent to restore primacy to the political party as the central unit of democratic accountability.

The Supreme Court of India has also reinforced this position in Subhash Desai vs Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra (2023), where a Constitution Bench declined to interpret the 10th Schedule in a manner that severs the figurative umbilical cord between a legislature party and its parent political party. The Court underscored that the political party continues to guide and control the actions of its elected members, even after electoral victory.

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The merger exception in question

The present controversy centres on the interpretation of Paragraph 4 of the 10th Schedule, which provides immunity from disqualification in cases of merger. The key question is whether such a merger can be effected solely by two-thirds of the members of a legislature party, or whether it must necessarily be preceded by, or reflect, a decision of the original political party itself.

A plain reading of Paragraph 4 suggests that the exemption applies where the “original political party” merges with another political party. The emphasis, therefore, is on the merger of the political party, not merely a numerical alignment within the legislature party. Hence, Paragraph 4(2), which introduces a deeming fiction based on the consent of two-thirds of legislators, cannot be read in isolation so as to displace the primacy of the political organisation. To do so would invert the constitutional design, effectively allowing the legislature party to dictate the fate of the political party.

This interpretation would be inconsistent with Parliament’s decision in exercise of constituent power to abolish the “split” exception, which had earlier permitted even a one-third faction to claim legitimacy. The threshold may have changed, but the principle remains that the internal dissent within the legislature party cannot override the identity and continuity of the political party.

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Beyond technicalities

At a broader level, the anti-defection law was not merely intended to regulate individual conduct but to preserve the integrity of the party system and, by extension, the institution of ‘opposition’ in democracy. While it does not entirely prohibit political realignments, it subjects them to constitutional discipline.

The recent AAP episode underscores the need for judicial clarity on whether legislative majorities can, in effect, appropriate the identity of the political party they were elected to represent. The answer will have far-reaching implications for parliamentary democracy.

As lyricist and former parliamentarian Javed Akhtar once observed in the Rajya Sabha, the essential distinction between democracy and dictatorship lies in the presence of an opposition. It is this opposition that the 10th Schedule seeks to safeguard. AAP has approached the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha under Paragraph 6 of the 10th Schedule to challenge the action of its seven “merged” MPs.

How the merger exception is ultimately interpreted will be significant, particularly for the continued vitality of the Opposition. In the absence of settled judicial clarity, the issue is likely, sooner rather than later, to invite authoritative determination by the Supreme Court. The hope, ultimately, is that constitutional adjudication will preserve the centrality of political parties within India’s parliamentary framework.

Vanshaj Azad is an Advocate, presently working as Law Clerk-cum-Research Associate at the Supreme Court of India