Supreme Court reiterates persistent refusal of sexual relations without reason constitutes mental cruelty, upholds divorce after 15 years of separation

The Supreme Court has upheld a decree of divorce in favour of a doctor, holding that persistent denial of conjugal rights, including refusal of sexual relations without reasonable cause, amounts to mental cruelty under the Hindu Marriage Act.

The Court also observed that where spouses have lived separately for over 15 years with no genuine effort at reconciliation, compelling them to continue the marriage would itself amount to cruelty.A Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Augustine George Masih dismissed an appeal filed by the wife against a Rajasthan High Court judgment granting divorce to her husband. While affirming the High Court's findings on cruelty, the Court also held that the case independently warranted dissolution of marriage in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution on account of its irretrievable breakdown.BackgroundThe parties, both government doctors, were married on 05.12.2007 according to Hindu rites. The wife was serving as a gynaecologist in Gujarat, while the husband was employed in the Rajasthan Government's medical service. No child was born out of the marriage.According to the husband, the couple lived together for only about two to three months during their nearly two-year matrimonial relationship.

Alleging cruelty, he filed a divorce petition under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act in 2009.The Family Court dismissed the petition, holding that the husband had failed to establish cruelty. On appeal, however, the Rajasthan High Court reversed the decision and granted a decree of divorce after concluding that the wife had denied him normal marital relations, remained away from the matrimonial home for long periods and that the parties had been living separately for nearly 15 years.Aggrieved by the judgement of the High Court, the wife challenged the judgment and approached the Supreme Court. She argued that she had never deserted her husband and had always been willing to continue the marriage. She also argued that the husband himself prevented her from performing her matrimonial obligations and that neither desertion nor irretrievable breakdown had been pleaded as grounds in the original divorce petition.The husband, on the other hand, argued that the marriage had existed only in name. He submitted that the parties had cohabited for barely two to three months, had lived separately for over 15 years and that repeated efforts at reconciliation, including mediation before the Supreme Court, had failed.Refusal Of Sexual Relations Without Reason Amounts To Mental CrueltyThe Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was justified in concluding that the husband had been subjected to mental cruelty.The Bench first dealt with one of the incidents relied upon by the High Court, that the wife had allegedly insulted the husband before a shopkeeper during a visit to the Taj Mahal. The Court found no merit in treating that incident as cruelty.It noted that the Family Court had rightly observed that the Taj Mahal was closed on the day of the visit and there was nothing unreasonable in the wife asking for a teddy bear. The Bench, therefore, agreed that this incident could not justify dissolution of the marriage.However, the Court reached a different conclusion on the issue of denial of conjugal relations.Referring to the evidence led before the Family Court, the Bench noted that even during the brief period the parties lived together, the wife would sleep separately, lock her room from inside and would not respond even when the husband knocked at the door. The husband was consequently compelled to sleep in another room.Significantly, the wife never disputed that the parties occupied separate rooms.The Court held that these facts clearly supported the husband's allegation that normal marital relations had been consistently denied.Relying on its landmark decision in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, the Bench reiterated that refusal to engage in normal marital intimacy without any valid reason strikes at the very foundation of marriage.The Court observed:"Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without there being any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty."Affirming the High Court’s finding, the Bench observed:“Denial of conjugal rights including persistent refusal of sexual intercourse without a reasonable cause constitutes mental cruelty and is a valid ground for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the HMA.”The Court further noted that Indian courts have consistently recognised that withholding sexual intimacy without justification causes deep emotional suffering and fundamentally undermines the marital relationship.The Bench observed that marriage is not merely a legal relationship but a partnership founded on companionship, emotional support and mutual obligations. Persistent withdrawal from one of its essential facets without any reasonable explanation inevitably causes mental cruelty to the other spouse.The Court, therefore, upheld the High Court's conclusion that the husband's plea of cruelty stood established on this ground.The Supreme Court then examined whether the prolonged separation between the parties and their conduct during the litigation furnished an additional ground to sustain the decree of divorce.The wife argued that desertion could not be relied upon since the husband had never pleaded it as a ground in the divorce petition. She also maintained that she had continued to serve in Gujarat only because the husband's father had permitted her to do so until a proposed nursing home was established in Bharatpur.The Court noted that the Family Court had accepted the evidence showing that the husband's father had indeed permitted the wife to continue her government service in Gujarat. However, the Bench observed that this by itself did not relieve either spouse of their matrimonial obligations."Merely because father-in-law had said so would not in itself mean a licence for not joining and fulfilling the matrimonial obligations," the Court observed.The Bench found that when it became evident that the proposed nursing home would not materialise, neither party made any meaningful effort to resume cohabitation. Nothing on record suggested that either spouse genuinely attempted to rebuild the matrimonial relationship.The Court clarified that although desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) had not been specifically pleaded, matrimonial disputes cannot be decided by looking only at the labels attached to the pleadings."The Court is also required to examine the overall conduct of the parties and the manner in which they have discharged their matrimonial obligations." The court observed.According to the Bench, an appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings. Consequently, an appellate court is entitled to consider subsequent events and the conduct of the parties during the pendency of litigation while determining whether the statutory ground of cruelty stands established.The Court observed that marriage cannot be viewed merely as a contractual arrangement or reduced to a dispute over enforcement of conjugal rights. Instead, it is a relationship founded on mutual respect, companionship, shared responsibilities and emotional support."Conjugal rights do not exist in a vacuum; they are the structural counterparts to conjugal duties," the Bench observed.The Court added that a spouse cannot insist upon matrimonial rights while simultaneously withdrawing from the corresponding obligations that sustain the marital relationship.Referring to its recent decision in Nayan Bhowmick v. Aparna Chakraborty, the Bench observed that in matrimonial disputes it is neither the role of society nor of the courts to decide which spouse's personal choices are correct."It is not for the society or for the Court to sit in judgment over which spouse's approach is correct or not."Instead, where both spouses remain unwilling to accommodate each other over a prolonged period, their rigid and uncompromising attitudes may themselves amount to mental cruelty.

The Court observed that in the present case, the parties had cohabited for only two to three months, had lived separately for more than fifteen years and had consistently failed to discharge the basic obligations arising out of marriage.The Bench held that compelling such parties to continue the relationship despite complete emotional alienation would itself amount to cruelty. Even otherwise, the Court held that the marriage had irretrievably broken down, making it a fit case for exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution.The Bench noted that the parties had been living separately for over fifteen years, had no children, and every attempt at reconciliation, including mediation before the Supreme Court, had failed. Both spouses were government doctors, financially independent and settled in different States.The Court reiterated by relying upon earlier decisions and held that Article 142 empowers the Supreme Court to dissolve a marriage where it is “totally unworkable, emotionally dead and beyond salvation.”The Bench observed that prolonged matrimonial litigation merely perpetuates a marriage on paper and prevents both parties from moving forward in life.“It is in the best interest of parties and the society if ties are severed between parties in cases where litigation has been pending for a considerably long period of time.”The Court further remarked that continuation of a dead marriage only escalates frustration and creates "psychological and mental hollowness," while denying both spouses the opportunity to lead independent lives.Holding that there was no possibility of the parties ever resuming cohabitation, the Supreme Court dismissed the wife's appeal, affirmed the decree of divorce granted by the Rajasthan High Court on the ground of mental cruelty, and, in any event, exercised its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to dissolve the marriage on the ground of its irretrievable breakdown. No order as to costs was passed.SLP (C) NO.10422 OF 2025; JUNE 2, 2026 SONAL TALPADA versus VEERBHAN SINGHFor Petitioner: Mr. Neeraj Shekhar, AOR Mrs. Kshama Sharma, Adv. Mr. Ritwik Prasad, Adv. Mr. Rajat Singh Chandel, Adv. Mr. Ujjwal Ashutosh, Adv. Ms. Avi Sahai, Adv. Mr. Rajesh Maurya, Adv. For Respondent: Mr. Mithilesh Jha, AOR Ms. Rishika Chahar, Adv. Ms. Sanskriti Mishra, Adv. Mr. Tarun Chauhan, Adv.(The author of this article, Vatsal Chandra is a Delhi-based Advocate practicing before the courts of Delhi NCR.)