US, Pak, China: The post-Sindoor world calls for a strategic reset

India’s pushback to Pakistan’s provocation in Pahalgam is an inflection point in regional geopolitics. There are big-picture lessons that must be absorbed to reorient Indian statecraft in a rapidly changing international and regional setting.

The Sino-Pakistan axis has acquired an operational reality that is difficult to ignore and not straightforward to counter. Most strategists recognise that India’s conventional superiority over Pakistan means little in the context of controlled limited conflicts that are likely to occur under the nuclear shadow. For all practical purposes, Pakistan is a near-peer military competitor. This is now further complicated by the presence of China’s military industrial complex that can selectively tilt the scales in Pakistan’s favour. China’s PLA, whose primary mission is to deny access to and potentially defeat the US in the Taiwan Straits, has spent the past decade modernising its forces for such a scenario. The focus has been on developing capabilities such as modern sensors, electronic intelligence satellites, electronic warfare, long range air-to-air missiles, and advanced tactical-combat aircraft. It is apparent that some of these capabilities have made their way to the Pakistan military.

Build on thaw: While the Sino-Pak axis is worrying, there is room to wean China away from Pakistan

China can buttress Pakistan’s conventional power to keep pace and perhaps even surpass India in select areas in the future. What works to India’s advantage is that unlike US and NATO hardware that come with well-known caveats and geopolitical risks, our ‘no-strings attached’ partnership with Russia’s advanced military -industrial complex allows the Indian military to integrate its growing indigenous capacities with select high-technology systems to maintain a qualitative edge.

This being said, it is futile for India to engage in an all-out arms race (in essence, with China) or frantically build up conventional power. Strategic nuclear and conventional deterrence for major contingencies is robust and expected to strengthen over time. Remember, the main challenge is countering asymmetric warfare with the new doctrine of assured and calibrated cost imposition on Pakistan. The means can vary over time — from the conventional to the sub-conventional to non-traditional areas like water security. There are obvious limits to China’s ability to protect Pakistan from the blowback of its asymmetric warfare.

There are larger questions that Indian policymakers can no longer brush under the carpet. Why did the Sino-Pak axis acquire such momentum in recent years? And, should India do anything to reshape Beijing’s calculations in the subcontinent?

First, there is no doubt that India’s declared China-centric alignment with the US over the past decade was the lightning rod for Beijing to deepen ties with Rawalpindi much beyond its traditional partnership model. But the US had no desire to open a geopolitical front with China in the subcontinent and did little to shore up India’s regional position. The US was primarily interested in drawing India into an extra-regional maritime role to support its security goals in the Western Pacific.

Quite extraordinarily then, the Chinese counter to India’s bold balance of power move with the US not only went unchallenged in the subcontinent, it actually led to a tacit convergence between Washington and Beijing on upholding Pakistan’s basic position in the regional order and the primacy of the Pakistan army at home. Nothing demonstrated this stark geopolitical reality to Delhi more than the recent crisis.

Can Indian statecraft arrest the deterioration in the regional chessboard that is partly the result of miscalculation from its own geostrategies? Beijing’s primary geopolitical threats emanate from its eastern seaboard and will only grow over time. There is room to wean China away from Pakistan and bring Beijing’s regional policy back towards a balance that is acceptable to Delhi. For this to occur, India must build on the 2024 thaw reached between the two leaderships and explore the possibility of a framework to normalise India-China relations.

As for the US, the normal will be different with or without Trump. There is no scope for a balance-of-power play with the US in the subcontinent.

It was self-deception to imagine India could simply ride American power to emerge as South Asia’s leading power. That outcome will have to be earned the way all regional and great powers acquired their material and normative strength — through broadening the domestic industrial, technological and human capital base of the Indian economy while intelligently leveraging the international environment. There is no other way in our multipolar age.

India doesn’t have to get bogged down in a low-level game with the Pakistan army. Nor should India swing into a proxy crusader against a rising China whose sights are set on countering the US in the Western Pacific. This crisis is an opportunity to craft a sophisticated grand strategy for a multipolar world. Only geopolitical incompetence can disrupt the India story from its long-range goals.

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