Is Iran Becoming A Military State? How Powerful And Dangerous Is The IRGC Now

Last Updated:April 24, 2026, 11:24 IST

According to US-based think tank Institute for the Study of War and US intelligence assessments, senior IRGC figures are playing a direct role in governance alongside Mojtaba

Iran’s power structure is undergoing a churning, with reports suggesting that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is emerging as the central force shaping both political and military decisions.

According to the Washington-based think tank, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and US intelligence assessments, senior IRGC figures, particularly Ahmad Vahidi, are playing a direct role in governance alongside Mojtaba Khamenei, the influential son of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who led the first round of negotiations with the US in Islamabad and was singled out by US President Donald Trump halfway into the war as Washington’s interlocutor, and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi cannot make decisions without the IRGC’s approval, according to the reports.

Reports also suggested that Vahidi himself has signalled this direction, arguing that under wartime conditions, critical positions must be controlled and managed directly by the Revolutionary Guards.

These developments hint at a more a deeper transformation within Iran’s system — one where military authority is beginning to outweigh civilian structures, potentially pushing the country toward a more overtly military-led model of governance.

What Is IRGC, And How Did It Become Powerful In Iran?

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was created in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution as a parallel force to Iran’s conventional military. Its original mandate was ideological as much as military — to protect the revolution and the clerical regime, and to ensure that no internal or external threat could overturn the new Islamic Republic.

Over the decades, however, the IRGC evolved into something far more complex. It developed its own intelligence networks, military command structures, and eventually an economic footprint that expanded into construction, energy, telecommunications, and logistics. By the early 2000s, it was no longer just a security institution but a central pillar of the state itself. It is estimated to have 190,000 active personnel.

Its external operations arm, the Quds Force, helped project Iran’s influence across West Asia, while its domestic reach ensured it remained deeply embedded in internal governance. The Quds Force is responsible for extraterritorial operations by directing proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Kata’ib Hizballah and other groups in Iraq. This gradual expansion turned the IRGC into what many analysts describe as a “state within a state," with influence that extends well beyond the barracks.

Other elements comprising the IRGC include:

Basij: It is a volunteer paramilitary force linked to the IRGC that is tasked with monitoring dissent, managing protests, and enforcing ideological conformity. Over the years, the Basij has been actively involved in suppressing major waves of unrest, including the 2009 Green Movement and the 2022-23 protests that followed the death of Mahsa Amini. Its methods range from visible street patrols to more covert tactics, such as infiltrating demonstrations to identify and track activists. The group is also deeply embedded in everyday institutions, with a presence in schools and universities where it monitors students and faculty through a wide network of informers.

Ground Forces: They are smaller than Iran’s regular army but are structured in a similar fashion and serve both internal and external roles. They have been deployed beyond Iran’s borders, particularly in Syria, where they supported forces loyal to Bashar al-Assad. Domestically, they have also been used alongside the Basij to contain protests and manage internal unrest.

Aerospace Force: It represents one of the IRGC’s most critical capabilities. Formed in 2009 through the consolidation of its air force, missile command, and early space programme, it oversees Iran’s ballistic missile systems, drones, and air defence networks. This branch has drawn global attention for its role in advancing Iran’s missile programme and for reportedly supplying drones used in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Naval Force: It operates differently from Iran’s conventional navy. It relies on smaller, fast-moving vessels designed for asymmetric warfare, particularly in strategic waterways like the Strait of Hormuz. Its tactics are built around speed, surprise, and disruption, making it a key player in regional maritime tensions.

Intelligence Organisation: It operates independently of Iran’s formal intelligence ministry. Its primary focus is internal security, including monitoring dissent and tracking individuals seen as opposed to the regime. This includes surveillance of journalists, activists, and online activity, often through cyber monitoring systems.

Intelligence Protection Organisation: This is responsible for safeguarding the IRGC from internal and external threats. It focuses on counter-intelligence, protecting sensitive assets, and ensuring the security of key personnel and operations within the organisation.

How Does IRGC Get Its Funding And Who Are The Key Players?

The IRGC’s financial strength is one of the main reasons for its enduring influence. Unlike traditional militaries that rely solely on government budgets, the IRGC operates a vast economic network.

The IRGC draws its recruits from a wide pool, including ordinary Iranian citizens as well as Shia communities abroad. Its outreach often focuses on individuals with strong ideological leanings, but economic factors also play a role, with financial incentives attracting those facing hardship.

One of its most controversial recruitment arms is the Basij, which relies heavily on volunteers, including teenagers. The group has faced international criticism for this practice and was sanctioned by the US in 2018 over allegations that it recruited and trained child soldiers.

Beyond Iran’s borders, the IRGC has built a network of foreign fighters through what is often referred to as the Shia Liberation Army. This force, led by Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani, includes recruits from countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. Many of these fighters are drawn in by economic necessity, even as they operate under Tehran’s strategic direction.

Financially, the IRGC commands a substantial share of Iran’s state resources. Under Iran’s 2025 budget, the IRGC has been allocated more than $6 billion, nearly double the funding provided to the country’s conventional armed forces. During periods of heightened tension, it has also received additional support, including an estimated $225 million following the assassination of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani in 2020.

The organisation’s financial reach extends well beyond state funding. The IRGC is deeply embedded in Iran’s economy, with interests spanning construction, energy, transport, and telecommunications. Its flagship engineering arm, Khatam al-Anbiya, has grown into one of the country’s largest contractors, overseeing 812 officially Iranian-registered companies and securing 1,700 government projects. These range from infrastructure development, such as roads, railways, and pipelines, to major oil and gas facilities.

According to the US Treasury Department, revenues generated through these commercial activities have also been used to support activities beyond Iran’s borders, including programmes linked to regional influence and strategic operations.

Sanctions imposed on Iran over the years have, paradoxically, strengthened the IRGC’s position. As formal economic channels became restricted, the IRGC’s ability to operate through informal and parallel networks gave it an advantage. It developed mechanisms to bypass restrictions, manage imports and exports, and sustain revenue streams even under pressure.

What Are The Current Dynamics Between IRGC And The Government?

Iran’s governance model has long been a hybrid, combining elected institutions with unelected centres of authority led by the Supreme Leader. However, recent developments indicate that this balance is shifting more decisively in favour of the IRGC.

Reports suggest that civilian institutions, including the presidency, are facing increasing constraints in decision-making. Access to top leadership is reportedly being mediated through security channels, while key appointments and policy directions are influenced by figures aligned with the IRGC.

Reports indicate that the IRGC has intervened in presidential appointments and tightened its grip around the country’s core power structures, sidelining the elected government from critical executive functions.

An attempt by President Masoud to appoint a new intelligence minister last week reportedly ran into direct resistance from IRGC commander Ahmad Vahidi, according to Iran International. Multiple candidates, including senior figure Hossein Dehghan, were rejected. According to these accounts, Vahidi argued that under current wartime conditions, sensitive leadership positions should be controlled directly by the IRGC.

Traditionally, such appointments are made by the president with the approval of the Supreme Leader, who holds ultimate authority over security portfolios. However, with uncertainty surrounding the current role and visibility of Mojtaba Khamenei, the IRGC’s influence appears to have expanded further.

How Much Is The IRGC Involved In The Current Conflict?

The IRGC has long been central to Iran’s military strategy, particularly in asymmetric warfare and regional operations. In the current conflict environment, its role has become even more prominent.

From managing naval operations in strategic waterways to coordinating responses across multiple theatres, the IRGC is at the forefront of Iran’s security posture. Its ability to operate both directly and through allied networks gives it a wide operational reach.

Recent developments, including heightened tensions in the Strait of Hormuz and broader regional confrontations, have underscored the IRGC’s role as the primary executor of Iran’s military strategy. Decisions on escalation, deterrence, and tactical responses are increasingly shaped by its leadership.

This prominence reinforces the perception that the IRGC is not just implementing policy, but actively shaping it.

Does This Mean Iran Is Turning Into A Military State?

Iran has historically been described as a theocratic republic, where religious authority and elected institutions coexist. The current shift, however, raises questions about whether that balance is being replaced by a more security-driven model.

The increasing centrality of the IRGC suggests a system where military considerations play a dominant role in governance. This does not mean that Iran has become a conventional military dictatorship. Its political structure still includes clerical oversight and electoral processes.

But the direction of change is significant. Power is gradually concentrating in institutions that prioritise security, control, and strategic decision-making over political plurality. In effect, Iran appears to be moving toward a model where the military establishment shapes the state’s trajectory, especially during periods of crisis.

This transformation is less about formal declarations and more about the steady redistribution of authority.

What Does This Power Shift Mean For India?

For India, the implications of this shift are both immediate and far-reaching. Iran occupies a critical position in global energy flows, particularly around the Strait of Hormuz, through which a substantial share of the world’s oil supply passes. Any escalation linked to a more assertive IRGC could disrupt these flows, pushing up global prices.

Given India’s dependence on imported energy, such disruptions can have direct economic consequences, affecting fuel prices, inflation, and overall growth.

Iran is also central to India’s strategic connectivity ambitions. Projects such as the Chabahar Port are designed to provide access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing traditional routes. A Business Standard report said on Friday that India is preparing to divest its stake in the Chabahar Port project and transfer it to a local Iranian entity.

A more security-centric governance structure in Iran could complicate long-term cooperation, especially if decision-making becomes more opaque or driven by strategic considerations.

At a strategic level, the shift raises a deeper question for India — how to engage with a country where power is increasingly concentrated in military and security institutions rather than conventional political structures.

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