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The Union government has come under attack from Opposition parties for its silence on the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei and five of his family members, including his infant granddaughter, as well as his top advisors, at the start of the conflict on February 28. Although External Affairs Minister (EAM) S. Jaishankar did speak with his Iranian counterpart Syed Abbas Araghchi on that day, there was no mention in any of the readouts of a condolence message or the condemnation of the U.S.-Israeli strikes in the heart of Tehran.
Joint U.S.-Israeli missile attacks bombed a girls’ primary school in Minab, southern Iran, killing around 150 and injuring about 100, according to UN estimates. On Sunday (March 1, 2026), the strikes damaged hospitals, including the Gandhi Hospital in northern Tehran, housed on Gandhi Street. In a media tour, officials showed blown out glass windows of the hospital, just across from a State TV tower, in a series of such attacks that the World Health Organization chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus called “deeply concerning”. Yet, New Delhi made no comment on the issue, leading to questions from even former Indian diplomats.
“The trend towards killing or abducting leaders of sovereign countries needs to be countered if we are to live in a civilised world, and not in the jungle. If countries do not come together to oppose this trend, they themselves may be ‘on the menu’ next,” one former Ambassador well-versed in international law, who asked not to be named, said.
Opposition parties have criticised the Narendra Modi government for the lack of comment, comparing the silence to India’s historical positions against the violation of territorial sovereignty and unilateral actions. However, New Delhi’s position is in contrast even to far more recent events in Iran. In January 2020, when the U.S. carried out a targeted assassination strike on Iran’s top General Qasem Soleimani, India called the tensions “alarming”.
“We have noted that a senior Iranian leader has been killed by the U.S.,” the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) had said in a statement. “The increase in tension has alarmed the world. Peace, stability and security in this region are of utmost importance to India. It is vital that the situation does not escalate further,” the statement added. Days later, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif travelled to Delhi to attend the Raisina Dialogue, and openly slammed U.S. President Donald Trump for ordering the killing.
In May 2024, India ordered a day of mourning over the death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Amir Abdollahian in a helicopter crash, and sent then Vice-President Jagdeep Dhankhar to the funeral. “They will always be remembered as friends of India who contributed immensely to the growth of the India-Iran relationship. Government of India stands in solidarity with the people of Iran at this very difficult time,” EAM Jaishankar wrote in a condolence book at the Iranian Embassy.
Within hours of the U.S.’s strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities on June 22, 2025, Prime Minister Modi called Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and expressed “deep concern” over the escalation. After initially hesitating, India even signed on to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS statements later in the year that condemned the U.S. and Israel’s unilateral strikes.
During the crisis, Iran made a special exception for India, opening its airspace only to allow planes carrying hundreds of Indian students safely back home.
What then explains the absence of any comment from India over the assassination of Iran’s leader, or the deadly strikes on schools and hospitals? The MEA did not respond to requests for a reasoning on its statements. Officials pointed to the MEA statement of February 28 that said India was “deeply concerned at the recent developments in Iran and the Gulf region”, urging all sides to avoid escalation, and a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security headed by Mr. Modi discussed options for Indians caught in the conflict in the region. On Tuesday (March 3, 2026), the MEA issued a fresh statement expressing “grave anxiety” on the continued escalation in India’s proximity.
When asked, experts said there were several factors behind India’s decision to not comment directly on the killings in Iran.
“First, the challenge of navigating today’s complex geopolitics. Second, a circumscribed relationship overall with Iran in recent decades, despite the Chabahar port. And third, Khamenei’s criticism of India on the issues of Kashmir and the treatment of minorities,” former Ambassador to Iran Rakesh Sood told The Hindu.
These are the five major considerations for New Delhi:
1. Israel: India has had a close security relationship with Israel for decades, but this has exponentially improved in the last few years, since Mr. Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Israel (in 2017), and then hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (in 2018). With Mr. Modi’s visit to Jerusalem last week, and his address to the Knesset, where he proclaimed India stands “with Israel, firmly, with full conviction, in this moment, and beyond”, New Delhi appears to be abandoning its traditional regional balance in favour of Israel. It is significant that after the initial strikes by Israel and Iran’s retaliatory strikes across the region, Mr. Modi spoke to Mr. Netanyahu and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) leaders, but not to his Iranian counterpart. Mr. Netanyahu, who hailed the killing of Mr. Khamenei, whom he called a “tyrant”, thanked Mr. Modi for his support “for Israel and for the Jewish people” during the conflict.
2. Iran-India ties: India’s ties with Iran have weakened concurrently, not as much due to ties with Israel, but over the tightening of U.S. sanctions on Iran. As a result, after zeroing out oil imports from Iran in 2018, India-Iran trade has wound down from about $17 billion in 2018 to about $1.68 billion in 2025, and investments in Iranian oil and gas fields have been frozen. In April, the U.S. will end its sanctions waiver for Chabahar port, and by every indication, India will wind up operating the Shahid Beheshti terminal it has developed at that time, unless the waiver is extended. The Modi government “front-loaded” its commitment of $120 million for the port, paying it in one go in November 2025, and most personnel have pulled out, according to reports. In the latest escalation, Israeli missiles targeted the Konark airport at Chabahar and have possibly destroyed other infrastructure there as well.
3. Concerns over Khamenei’s statements: India-Iran relations had weathered many political storms in earlier decades, when Khamenei was President of Iran from 1981-1989, and then Supreme Leader after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. In 1994, after an outreach from India, Iran chose not to join Pakistan and many Arab countries on a resolution on Kashmir at the UN Human Rights Council. However, more recently, New Delhi had taken umbrage to his comments about internal developments in India, including criticism of the Centre’s Kashmir policy in 2017, and then after the Article 370 amendments in 2019, as well as his statement in March 2020, referring to the Delhi riots as proof of a “massacre of Muslims” in India.
4. India-Gulf ties: India’s silence may also be explained by its desire to not upset ties in the Gulf region, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia, where Iran has targeted U.S. bases, oil facilities, and infrastructure. In particular, India’s ties with the UAE have been strengthened by a defence partnership announced during UAE President Mohammad Bin Zayed’s two-hour visit to Delhi in January this year. Government officials told The Hindu that it is not possible to take any step that could jeopardise the safety of 10 million Indians who live and work in Gulf countries. In comparison, there are about 4,000-5,000 Indians in Iran, and about 20,000 in Israel. With India’s reduction in the import of Russian oil, imports from the Gulf have increased in the past few months, and much of India’s trade with GCC countries is at stake as well.
5. India-U.S. ties: The Modi government has only just begun to restore ties with the Trump administration after the U.S.’s reduction of tariffs, and agreement on trade that was announced in February 2026. In addition, the U.S. has included India in its Pax Silica critical technology supply chain, and a string of U.S. officials are now headed to India, including this week, for the Raisina Dialogue. Given the Trump administration’s mercurial nature, and threats of sanctions on any engagement with Iran, New Delhi may prefer playing safe.
New Delhi has some more tough choices ahead, however, as Mr. Trump has indicated that U.S. operations against Iran could continue for several weeks, and that he is open to “boots on the ground”, or sending U.S. forces into Iran. Apart from the travel, trade, connectivity, and energy disruptions, India must also consider its standing in the Global South if it chooses to side with the U.S.-led coalition against Iran. In addition, New Delhi is due to host the BRICS summit this year, and the war and its outcome will have a lasting impact on the grouping that now includes Iran and the UAE, now rivals in the conflict.
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